Is double non-taxation a BEPS concern, and can a multilateral instrument prevent it?


  • QUESTION POSTED BY: Student
  • PROGRAMME: Postgraduate Diploma in International Taxation
  • TOPIC: Introduction to International Taxation (WEEKS 1 & 2)
  • LECTURER: Dr Daniel N Erasmus

FULL QUESTION

Drawing from an example on international double taxation, we see that the interaction of domestic tax laws and treaty provisions for State A and State B resulted in double non-taxation. Would this scenario be considered as a case in point for the BEPS concerns? If yes, how would a multilateral instrument help to resolve or prevent such a scenario?

ADDITIONAL WRITTEN ANSWER

Yes, the scenario described in your example—where the interaction of domestic tax laws and treaty provisions leads to double non-taxation—directly aligns with the concerns of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). BEPS involves strategies by multinational corporations to exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity, thereby reducing their overall tax burden. Double non-taxation is a hallmark issue that BEPS initiatives aim to address.

 How BEPS Relates to Double Non-Taxation

Double non-taxation occurs when income is neither taxed by the resident state nor by the source state due to discrepancies or mismatches between the tax systems and treaties of the two states involved. This is precisely the type of loophole that BEPS projects target, as it allows corporations to significantly lower their effective tax rate, which in turn affects global tax revenues and the integrity of tax systems.

 Role of Multilateral Instrument (MLI) in Addressing BEPS

To combat BEPS, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed a set of actions, prominently including the development of a Multilateral Instrument (MLI). The MLI is designed to swiftly implement a series of tax treaty measures to update international tax rules and lessen the opportunity for tax avoidance by multinational enterprises. Here’s how the MLI helps resolve or prevent scenarios of double non-taxation:

  • Preventing Treaty Abuse: One of the primary goals of the MLI is to prevent treaty abuse, which often leads to double non-taxation. It incorporates provisions that ensure tax treaties are used to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for double non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion and avoidance.
  • Principal Purpose Test (PPT): The MLI introduces the Principal Purpose Test, which is intended to deny treaty benefits in situations where obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction. This would directly counteract arrangements that lead to double non-taxation.
  • Dispute Resolution: The MLI enhances mechanisms for resolving disputes resulting from the interpretation and application of tax treaties, ensuring that aggressive tax planning strategies that lead to double non-taxation can be identified and addressed more effectively.
  • Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: The MLI addresses mismatches in entity and instrument characterization to prevent the exploitation of differences in tax systems for aggressive tax planning.
  • Transparency and Consistency: By standardizing treaty provisions, the MLI increases transparency and consistency in the application of tax laws across borders, thereby limiting opportunities for BEPS.