This decision concerns an application by Andrew Johnson for permission to appeal out of time against a closure notice dated 23 May 2023 and a penalty assessment dated 30 May 2023. The Tribunal considered the chronology of events, including Mr Johnson's non-residence in the UK, his agent's illness, and the periods of delay before an appeal was eventually notified to HMRC and then to the Tribunal.
Applying the three-stage test from Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC), the Tribunal found the overall delay to be serious and significant, and ultimately declined to exercise its discretion to allow a late appeal (paras 1, 50).
Mr Johnson founded a limited company called Aurora in 2000. He said that by 2007, following the company's international expansion, he ceased to be a director and employee of Aurora (para 5).
On 10 February 2022, Mr Johnson's tax advisers (the 'Agents') submitted form 64-8 to act as his agent. On 3 March 2022, Aurora submitted a P11D for employee benefits relating to Mr Johnson for the tax year ending 5 April 2021, said to be a correction of a previously incorrect P11D (paras 6 to 7).
In around September 2022, the adviser acting for Mr Johnson at the Agents (the 'Adviser') took absence from work due to serious illness; Mr Johnson believed the Adviser returned in September 2023 (para 8).
HMRC opened a compliance check into Mr Johnson's tax position on 21 March 2023. This resulted in a closure notice on 23 May 2023 and a penalty assessment letter on 30 May 2023. The deadline for an in-time appeal against the closure notice was 22 June 2023, and against the penalty assessment was 29 June 2023 (paras 9 to 10, 21 to 22).
Correspondence from HMRC was sent to the Agents and to an address in London where Mr Johnson said he no longer lived, as he is no longer resident in the UK. He gave evidence of his days spent in the UK: 21 days in 2023, 47 days in 2024, 37 days in 2025, and one day in 2026 (para 18).
Mr Johnson applied for permission to appeal out of time against the closure notice of 23 May 2023, which amended his self-assessment, and the penalty assessment of 30 May 2023. He said he first became aware of the penalty in February 2024, when his Adviser emailed him and assured him they 'were on it' (para 11).
On 26 July 2024, the Adviser contacted HMRC, and this was accepted by HMRC as the date on which the application to appeal against the closure notice commenced (para 12). HMRC replied on 6 August 2024, stating it could only rely on the P11D provided by Mr Johnson's employer, that no revised P11D had been submitted by the employer, and that Mr Johnson should take the matter up with his employer (para 13).
The Adviser informed HMRC on 9 August 2024 that Mr Johnson would be appealing the closure notice, and the appeal was submitted. HMRC refused the appeal on 25 November 2024, notifying Mr Johnson of his right to appeal to the Tribunal. The appeal was notified to the Tribunal on 4 April 2025 (paras 14 to 17).
The dispute before the Tribunal was whether, applying the Martland test, permission should be granted for Mr Johnson to pursue a late appeal against both the closure notice and the penalty assessment.
The Tribunal applied the three-stage test in Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC). At stage one, it found the delay serious and significant, noting that in the context of 30-day time limits, a delay of more than a year was serious and significant (paras 20 to 23).
The Tribunal accepted that Mr Johnson's non-residence meant it was reasonable for him not to have updated HMRC's records, and accepted his evidence that he did not become aware of the Closure Notice or Penalty Assessment until some time in February 2024, assumed for these purposes to be 29 February 2024 (paras 24, 26). It found that family illness and Covid lockdowns had no material bearing on the delay (para 25). Until 29 February 2024, the Tribunal found Mr Johnson had a compelling reason for not appealing, since he did not know there was anything to appeal (paras 27, 29).
For the period from 29 February 2024 to 26 July 2024, a delay of nearly five months, the Tribunal found this was itself serious and significant. It held that reliance on an agent is not, without more, a sufficient explanation for delay, and that a reasonable taxpayer in Mr Johnson's position would have sought some oversight of the Agent's actions. Mr Johnson did not outline any steps taken to ensure expedition by the Agent (paras 32 to 37).
The Tribunal also noted the further delay of more than four months between HMRC's review conclusion on 25 November 2024 and notification to the Tribunal on 4 April 2025, for which no explanation beyond continued reliance on the Agent was given (paras 38 to 40).
At stage three, the Tribunal balanced the substantial, systemic prejudice to HMRC in being denied certainty and the ability to close matters, against the substantial prejudice to Mr Johnson in being denied the ability to challenge the assessment and penalty. It declined to assess the merits of the prospective appeal in detail, concluding only that it was 'not obviously hopeless', attaching some, but not substantial, weight to this factor (paras 44 to 46). The Tribunal also had regard to the importance of efficient and cost-appropriate litigation and respect for statutory time limits (para 47).
The Tribunal concluded that the lack of positive action by Mr Johnson to ensure prompt action from his Agent, combined with the prejudice to HMRC and the principles of efficient administration of justice, outweighed the prejudice to Mr Johnson (para 48).
It accepted there was a compelling reason for the delay up to February 2024 but found no satisfactory explanation for the period thereafter, holding that a reasonable taxpayer would have exercised oversight over his agent's actions (para 49).
The Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to allow the appeal out of time. Permission to appeal out of time was refused in relation to both the closure notice and the penalty assessment (paras 2, 50).