This is a ruling on a Notice of Motion dated 6th July 2026, filed under a Certificate of Urgency and supported by an Affidavit sworn by Ronankkumar Rajendrakumar Parikh (para 1). The Applicant sought leave to appeal a valuation and tariff classification ruling issued by the Kenya Revenue Authority on 22nd May 2025 (ruling number KRA/CBC/BIA/VHQ/1651/05/2025, Entry Number 25EMKIM400467632), an extension of time to lodge the intended appeal, a stay of enforcement of the impugned ruling pending appeal, and costs (para 1).
The Respondent opposed the application, arguing that the Applicant had not met the conditions under Section 13(4) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013 and Rule 10(2) and 10(3) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2015, and that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable and amounted to laches (para 3).
The Tribunal found that the operative Section 229 review decision for computing the appeal period was the Respondent's letter dated 5th December 2025, not the original ruling of 22nd May 2025 (paras 25-26). Applying Section 62 of the Laws of the Community (Interpretation) Act, 2004, the Tribunal calculated that the 45-day period under Section 230(2) of EACCMA expired on 19th January 2026, making the application, filed on 8th July 2026, approximately 170 days out of time rather than the one year two months contended by the Respondent (paras 27-28).
Having weighed the explanation for delay, the arguability of the intended appeal, and the balance of prejudice, the Tribunal allowed the application, finding that the Applicant had established 'other reasonable cause' under Section 13(4) of the TAT Act (paras 47-49).
The Applicant filed a Notice of Motion dated 6th July 2026, under a Certificate of Urgency, supported by an Affidavit sworn by Ronankkumar Rajendrakumar Parikh, seeking leave to appeal against a valuation and tariff classification ruling issued by the Kenya Revenue Authority on 22nd May 2025 under ruling number KRA/CBC/BIA/VHQ/1651/05/2025, Entry Number 25EMKIM400467632, pursuant to Section 229 of the EACCMA (para 1).
The Applicant also sought an extension of time to file the intended appeal, a stay of enforcement of the impugned ruling and consequential demands, penalties and interest, and costs (para 1).
The grounds advanced included that the ruling was erroneous in law and fact, that the intended appeal raised substantial questions under the Harmonized System and EACCMA, that the delay was caused by the Applicant's clearance agent failing to advise it of the Respondent's decision, and that the impugned ruling exposed the Applicant to escalating penalties, interest and enforcement action (para 2).
The documentary chronology showed that the Respondent communicated a decision on 25th September 2025, the Applicant sought reconsideration on 9th October 2025 and again on 29th November 2025, and the Respondent issued a further letter dated 5th December 2025 upholding its valuation decision and informing the Applicant of its right of appeal under Section 230 of EACCMA (para 25).
The principal issue was whether the Applicant had established a proper basis for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to extend time for lodging its intended appeal under Section 13 of the TAT Act (para 22).
The Respondent contended that the Applicant had not demonstrated absence from Kenya, sickness or other reasonable cause under Section 13(4) of the TAT Act and Rule 10(2) and 10(3) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, and that the delay, computed from the 22nd May 2025 ruling, was inordinate and inexcusable (paras 14-18).
The Respondent further argued that under Section 148 of EACCMA, an owner who authorises an agent remains liable for the acts and declarations of that agent, so the Applicant could not avoid responsibility for its clearance agent's alleged failure to communicate the decision (para 16).
The Applicant maintained that the delay was neither deliberate nor inordinate, that the lapse by its clearance agent constituted 'other reasonable cause' under Section 13 of the TAT Act, and that the intended appeal was arguable, raising genuine questions on the rejection of the declared transaction value, the valuation method adopted, and the tariff classification applied (paras 8-9).
The Tribunal held that the material provisions governing the dispute were Sections 229 and 230 of EACCMA, with Section 230(2) requiring an appeal to be lodged within forty-five days after service of the Commissioner's review decision (paras 23-24).
The Tribunal found that the letter of 5th December 2025 was the operative Section 229 review decision for purposes of the intended appeal, not the original ruling of 22nd May 2025, so the Respondent's computation of delay proceeded from the wrong statutory starting point (paras 25-26).
Applying Section 62 of the Laws of the Community (Interpretation) Act, 2004, the Tribunal calculated that the forty-fifth day fell on Monday, 19th January 2026, and that the Application, filed on 8th July 2026, was approximately 170 days out of time, rather than the one year two months argued by the Respondent (paras 27-28).
The Tribunal found that Section 148 of EACCMA, which fixes the owner's substantive liability for an agent's acts and declarations, does not preclude the Tribunal from considering, under its procedural discretion in Section 13 of the TAT Act, whether a communication lapse involving the agent constituted reasonable cause for delay (paras 36-37).
The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had not placed evidence before it establishing the date and manner of service of the 5th December 2025 decision, and that the Applicant's explanation, though it could have been fuller, was consistent with commercial use of a clearance agent and had not been displaced (paras 38-39).
The Tribunal found the true period of default to be slightly under six months, appreciable but not so inordinate as to extinguish the right of appeal, referencing Director of Public Prosecutions v SC & 6 others [2026] KECA 423 (KLR) where a delay of about five months was not fatal (paras 40-41).
The Tribunal found the intended appeal not frivolous, raising questions under Section 122 and the Fourth Schedule to EACCMA on rejection of declared transaction value, the valuation method adopted, supporting documents, and tariff classification under the Harmonised System, applying the arguability threshold from Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Nicholas Ombija [2009] eKLR (paras 42-43).
On prejudice, the Tribunal found the Respondent had not identified any evidentiary or third-party prejudice and that its interest was principally monetary, whereas refusal of leave would permanently foreclose the Applicant's only opportunity to challenge the decision (paras 44-45).
The Tribunal concluded that Articles 47, 48, 50 and 159(2)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya inform but do not displace the statutory requirement to demonstrate reasonable cause, and that the finite period of default, the explanation advanced, the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the Respondent, and the arguable nature of the intended appeal collectively favoured determination on the merits (paras 46-47).
The Tribunal found the Application meritorious and allowed it (paras 49-50).
The Applicant was ordered to file and serve its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Statement of Facts and the documents prescribed under Section 13(2) of the TAT Act within seven (7) days from the date of delivery of the Ruling (para 50(b)).
The Respondent was granted thirty (30) days from the date of service by the Applicant to file its response (para 50(c)).
No orders were made as to costs (para 50(d)).