Judgment summary
This is a decision on an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) following a reconsideration hearing on 12 February 2026. Mr Rodrigues sought permission to challenge a First-tier Tribunal decision refusing him permission to make late appeals against two penalty liability notices (PLNs) totalling £737,124.73, one relating to a corporation tax assessment and one to a VAT assessment issued to Pazzia Limited ("the Company").
The FTT had already refused permission to appeal its own decision on 1 August 2025, and Mr Rodrigues renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal, which was initially refused on the papers on 7 October 2025 before being reconsidered at an oral hearing.
Judge Jeanette Zaman refused permission to appeal on both grounds advanced, holding that neither disclosed an arguable error of law by the FTT.
Background
The PLNs were dated 27 July 2018 and addressed to Mr Rodrigues at an address on Ashley Crescent (paragraph 6, 14). The appeals against the PLNs were not made to the FTT until 18 December 2020 (paragraph 6).
The FTT's substantive decision on the application for permission to make late appeals was released on 13 June 2024 (TC/2020/044/94) (paragraph 1). The FTT refused permission on both grounds sought, in a decision notice released on 1 August 2025 (paragraph 2).
Mr Rodrigues renewed his application to the Upper Tribunal on 28 August 2025, within the applicable time limit (paragraph 2). Judge Zaman refused that application on the papers on 7 October 2025, and Mr Rodrigues sought reconsideration at an oral hearing, which took place on 12 February 2026 (paragraph 2, 3).
Core dispute
Mr Rodrigues advanced two grounds of appeal. Ground 1 was that the FTT erred in determining the first stage of the test in Martland, because its finding that there was a significant delay in filing the appeal was not open to it on the available evidence (paragraph 7, 10). At the hearing this was reframed to focus on whether HMRC had properly given written notice of the PLNs to Mr Rodrigues under paragraph 19 of Schedule 24, and on the relevance of section 83G(1) Value Added Tax Act 1994, as opposed to relying on the knowledge or awareness of various advisers, namely ATS, Turpin, Azed and Co, and Reliance (paragraph 13, 22).
Ground 2 was that the FTT erred in determining the third stage of Martland, either by not considering, or not adequately considering, all relevant circumstances, in particular by failing to weigh the prejudice Mr Rodrigues would suffer if the appeal was not admitted (paragraph 7, 34).
Court findings
On Ground 1, the Upper Tribunal held that section 83G VATA 1994 does not apply to an appeal against a PLN, since section 83 (to which section 83G relates) does not list PLN appeals among the matters over which the tribunal has jurisdiction, and paragraph 19 of Schedule 24 does not import section 83G for this purpose (paragraph 23(1)). Even if section 83G did apply, limb (ii) (concerning "a person other than P") could not assist Mr Rodrigues, because he is the person to whom the PLNs were issued and the person seeking to appeal them (paragraph 23(2)).
The Tribunal noted that paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 24 requires HMRC to give written notice of the specified portion of a penalty to the officer concerned (paragraph 18, 19). The FTT had found as fact that the PLNs were sent to Mr Rodrigues' home address at Ashley Crescent (FTT[112]), and that Mr Rodrigues had told Turpin's Mr Armstrong that he had received the PLNs (FTT[114]). The FTT rejected Mr Rodrigues' evidence that he was living elsewhere at the time as not credible, and found the water bill he produced for another property did not assist (FTT[176]-[179]).
The Upper Tribunal held that the FTT was entitled to consider the knowledge and role of various advisers in the context of assessing the reasons for delay under Martland stages 1 and 2, and that this did not mean the FTT had overlooked the requirement for HMRC to give written notice to Mr Rodrigues directly (paragraph 30, 31). It was also not an arguable error for the FTT to decline to consider a hypothetical alternative scenario premised on Mr Rodrigues only becoming aware of the PLNs via Reliance in August 2020 (paragraph 32).
On Ground 2, the Tribunal found that, since no arguable error had been identified under Ground 1, no such error could have infected the FTT's stage 3 analysis (paragraph 37). The Tribunal reviewed the FTT's stage 3 reasoning (FTT[174]-[196]), which included assessment of the credibility of Mr Rodrigues' evidence, the strength of his prospective challenge to the PLNs, and an acknowledgment that he would be prejudiced by refusal of permission because he would remain liable for a substantial sum, but that this could not outweigh a significant and unexplained delay (paragraph 38). The Upper Tribunal held that Mr Iqbal's submissions amounted to a challenge to the FTT's evaluative judgment, with which an appellate tribunal should be slow to interfere, and found no basis to do so (paragraph 39).
Outcome
Permission to appeal was refused on both Ground 1 and Ground 2 (paragraph 33, 40, 41). The Upper Tribunal concluded that neither ground disclosed an arguable error of law by the FTT.
Major issues / areas of contention
- Whether the FTT erred in law at Martland stage 1 by finding a significant delay in filing the appeal that was not open to it on the evidence.
- Whether section 83G(1) Value Added Tax Act 1994 applies to appeals against penalty liability notices issued under paragraph 19 of Schedule 24, and whether Mr Rodrigues could be treated as 'a person other than P' for that purpose.
- Whether HMRC's obligation under paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 24 to give written notice to the officer was satisfied, and whether the FTT wrongly relied on the awareness of third-party advisers rather than direct notice to Mr Rodrigues.
- Whether the FTT erred in law at Martland stage 3 by failing adequately to weigh the prejudice Mr Rodrigues would suffer if permission to appeal late were refused.
- The extent to which an appellate tribunal should interfere with findings of fact and evaluative judgments made by the FTT.