The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) considered an application by City Doctoral Researchers Association for permission to appeal against three First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) decisions striking out its appeals for want of jurisdiction, and against subsequent refusals of permission to appeal by the FTT.
The underlying appeals concerned the Charity Commission's decisions to take no action in response to the Applicant's complaints about the conduct of three charities. The FTT struck out the appeals under Rule 8(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 on the basis that it had no jurisdiction.
The Upper Tribunal Judge had already refused permission on the papers in decisions released on 22 and 30 July 2026, and the Applicant sought reconsideration at an oral hearing held by video on 14 September 2026, attended by Flavio Fellica, General Secretary of the Applicant.
The Judge refused permission to appeal, finding no realistic prospect of success on any of the grounds advanced.
The Applicant appealed to the FTT against decisions of the Charity Commission concerning complaints about the conduct of three institutions: the Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (FTT decision released 20 March 2025, permission to appeal refused 1 May 2025), the European Academy of Optometry and Optics (FTT decision released 10 June 2025, permission to appeal refused 15 July 2025), and the City, University of London, Students Union (FTT decision released 4 August 2025, permission to appeal refused 15 September 2025) (1).
In each case the Commission declined to take any action in respect of the Applicant's complaints, and the FTT struck out the resulting appeals under Rule 8(2) on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction (4)-(5).
The FTT's jurisdiction over Commission decisions is governed by the table in Schedule 6 of the Charities Act 2011, which specifies the matters, persons entitled to appeal, and the FTT's powers (6)-(7).
The Applicant argued that the Commission's decisions to take no action on its complaints amounted to decisions not to remove the institutions from the register under section 34(1)(a) of the Charities Act 2011, falling within the second entry of the Schedule 6 table, and that its members were 'other persons who are or may be affected' under column 2(c), giving a right of appeal (8), (11).
Alternatively, the Applicant argued that a failure to make a decision, or a failure to act or review its inaction, was itself justiciable, relying on Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513 (10).
The Applicant further submitted that the FTT had power under section 321 of the Charities Act 2011 to review a 'reviewable matter', including a decision to institute inquiries under section 46, applying judicial review principles (12).
The Applicant also raised grounds alleging procedural injustice in the manner in which the FTT conducted its proceedings (16).
The Judge held it was not arguable that the FTT erred in finding that there must have been an actual decision by the Commission to remove or not remove a charity from the register for jurisdiction to arise under Schedule 6; inaction, or a decision to take no action on a complaint, is not a decision under section 34 (9), (13).
Padfield and ex parte Fire Brigades Union were held not to apply, as those cases concerned the unrestricted scope of the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction, which is far wider than the FTT's statutory jurisdiction under the Charities Act 2011 (13).
On section 321, the Judge held that only the Attorney General or the persons specified in column 2 (persons with control or management of the institution, or the institution itself if a body corporate) may apply for a review; neither the Applicant nor its members had standing (14).
The Judge also found that provisions inserted into the Charities Act 2011 by the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016, dealing with warnings and rule-making powers, gave no right of appeal to the FTT (15).
On procedural injustice, the Judge held that even if such injustice were established, the remedy would be remittal or remaking of the decision, which would inevitably still result in strike-out for lack of jurisdiction; the Judge was in any event not persuaded that any procedural injustice had occurred (16).
Permission to appeal was refused (17).