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Case summary · 19 October 2026

Constantin Surugiu v The Commissioners for HMRC

Income TaxTax AdministrationPenalties and InterestTax Court Procedure
Late AppealSection 31 TMA 1970Appealable DecisionStatutory JurisdictionLate Payment PenaltyLate Filing PenaltyIdentity Fraud AllegationCIS IncomeSelf AssessmentRule 29(3)Supervisory JurisdictionHok PrincipleAspin V Estill

Judgment summary

The Tribunal determined this appeal without a hearing under Rule 29(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (1). The appeal concerned eleven penalties identified in HMRC's Notice dated 28 July 2026, totalling £2,796.00 (1).

The Tribunal had to decide whether to grant permission for the appeal to proceed out of time and whether any matters beyond the penalty appeals fell within its jurisdiction (2).

Permission was granted to bring the appeal out of time, HMRC not opposing the application (17, 18, 32). The appeal against the eleven penalties was allowed because HMRC no longer sought to defend them (19, 30, 33). The Tribunal declined to determine the appellant's wider allegations of identity fraud and related liabilities, finding no appealable decision had been identified in relation to those matters (26, 27, 34).

Background

The appeal was commenced by a Notice of Appeal dated 22 April 2026, in which the Appellant challenged a number of liabilities recorded by HMRC in his name, maintaining they arose from fraudulent use of his identity by third parties, and also appealed against a number of penalties (3).

On 28 July 2026 HMRC filed a Notice identifying the appealable decisions before the Tribunal as eleven penalties totalling £2,796.00, relating to late payment and late filing penalties for tax years ending 5 April 2017 and 5 April 2019 (4).

HMRC stated it did not oppose the application for permission to bring the appeal out of time, and that having reviewed the matter it would not defend the appeal against the penalty assessments, inviting the Tribunal to allow the appeal. HMRC also stated that other liabilities on the Appellant's statement of account did not form part of the appealable decisions before the Tribunal (5).

In his response dated 29 July 2026, the Appellant agreed permission should be granted and that the identified penalties should be cancelled, but maintained his appeal was not limited to those penalties, contending the Tribunal should also determine issues concerning alleged identity fraud, Self Assessment liabilities, CIS-related income, repayments, over-repayment liabilities and associated matters (6).

By directions issued on 20 August 2026, the Tribunal invited HMRC to explain its position on jurisdiction. HMRC submitted that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to appealable decisions under section 31 TMA 1970 or another applicable statutory provision, that the only appealable decisions in this case were the penalties, and that the remaining matters raised by the Appellant did not arise from appealable decisions within the Tribunal's jurisdiction (7).

Core dispute

The central question was whether permission should be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time and whether any matters remained before the Tribunal beyond the penalty appeals (2).

The Appellant maintained that his appeal was not confined to the eleven penalties and that the Tribunal should also determine wider issues including alleged identity fraud, disputed Self Assessment liabilities, CIS-related income, repayments and over-repayment liabilities (6, 23).

HMRC maintained that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is wholly statutory, that the only appealable decisions identified were the eleven penalties, and that the remaining liabilities referred to by the Appellant were self-assessed amounts not arising from assessments or other appealable decisions falling within section 31 TMA 1970, and that complaints about HMRC's handling of the Appellant's affairs did not fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction (24).

Court findings

The Tribunal held that its jurisdiction derives wholly from statute, that it possesses no inherent jurisdiction and may exercise only powers conferred by Parliament (8). It noted that rights of appeal in direct tax matters arise only where Parliament has provided a statutory right of appeal, with section 31 TMA 1970 identifying the relevant decisions for income tax matters (9).

The Tribunal relied on Aspin v Estill (Inspector of Taxes) [1987] STC 723 for the distinction between a challenge to whether tax is due as a matter of law, which falls within the statutory appeal jurisdiction, and a complaint that enforcement would be unfair or oppressive, which does not (11). It also relied on HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) and Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] EWCA Civ 713 for the principle that the Tribunal has no general power to override statutory liabilities or supervise HMRC's conduct on grounds of fairness, and that its jurisdiction does not extend to public law challenges concerning fairness of HMRC's treatment of a taxpayer (12).

Applying these principles, the Tribunal was satisfied that permission should be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time, given HMRC's non-opposition and the Appellant's explanation, with no apparent prejudice to the fair determination of the appeal (18).

The Tribunal accepted HMRC's jurisdictional analysis, finding that neither the Notice of Appeal nor subsequent material identified any assessment, amendment, closure notice, discovery assessment or other appealable decision in relation to the wider liabilities raised by the Appellant (25, 26). It held that the existence of a dispute concerning liabilities recorded by HMRC does not itself create a right of appeal, and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the seriousness of the allegations advanced (27). Even if HMRC had failed to investigate the fraud allegations adequately or to respond to correspondence, such matters would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal (28).

The Tribunal emphasised that nothing in the decision should be taken as a finding, positive or negative, regarding the Appellant's allegations of identity fraud or the wider matters raised, as those matters had not been determined (31).

Outcome

Permission for the appeal to proceed out of time was granted (32).

The appeal against the eleven penalties identified at paragraph 4, totalling £2,796.00, was allowed (19, 30, 33).

The Tribunal made no determination in relation to the wider matters raised by the Appellant because no appealable decision conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal had been identified in relation to those matters (34).

Major issues / areas of contention

  • Whether permission should be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time (2, 15-18).
  • Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine matters beyond the eleven penalties identified by HMRC (2, 23-29).
  • Whether HMRC's non-defence of the penalty assessments meant the appeal against those penalties should be allowed (5, 19, 30).
  • Whether allegations of identity fraud, disputed Self Assessment liabilities, CIS-related income and repayments arose from appealable decisions within section 31 TMA 1970 (24, 26, 27).
  • Whether complaints about HMRC's administration, conduct or complaint handling fall within the Tribunal's statutory jurisdiction (10, 12, 28).