Judgment summary
This appeal concerned a decision by HMRC dated 2 July 2018 to compulsorily register Foy Wealth Limited for VAT, assess VAT of £958,578, and impose a penalty of £143,786.70 ("the Disputed Decision") (1). The Appellant lodged a Notice of Appeal on 8 January 2026, arguing the appeal was in time because HMRC had never notified the conclusion of a statutory review requested in July 2018, or alternatively seeking permission for a late appeal (2).
The Tribunal determined the case on the papers under Rule 26 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, having also issued directions on 13 May 2026 requiring the parties to identify any document notifying the conclusion of the review (introductory sections, 36-38).
The Tribunal found that a valid request for a review had been made in July 2018 by the Appellant's then agents, Pesters Chartered Accountants, and that HMRC were therefore required to carry out a review under section 83C VATA 1994 (16, 28). However, no document notifying the conclusions of that review had ever been provided, and the witness statement of Adam Johnson dated 22 December 2025, prepared for insolvency proceedings, did not amount to such notification (39-48).
Applying the statutory definition of 'conclusion date' in section 83G(7) VATA 1994, the Tribunal held that no conclusion date had occurred, meaning the appeal had been brought prematurely rather than late, and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear it (49-58). The appeal was struck out pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Rules (60, 63).
Background
On 2 July 2018 HMRC sent the Disputed Decision to the Appellant, comprising a compulsory VAT registration decision, a VAT assessment of £958,578 and a penalty of £143,786.70 (4, 1). The decision letter informed the Appellant it could request a review by an HMRC officer not previously involved, or appeal to an independent tribunal (5).
On 26 July 2018, Pesters Chartered Accountants, newly appointed agents for the Appellant, wrote to HMRC disputing liability on VAT exemption grounds and requesting that 'the case is reviewed' (6). On 7 September 2018 HMRC wrote demanding payment and warning of enforcement action, and Pesters responded the same day reiterating their position and asking that further action be postponed pending a reply (7-8).
No further correspondence followed from HMRC until 9 May 2025, when HMRC wrote referring to an 'Environmental Duty amount overdue' of £1,108,979.79 (9). On 27 May 2025 HMRC clarified the debt related to the Disputed Decision (11). On 30 September 2025 HMRC filed a winding-up petition for £1,119,158.70, of which £1,102,364.70 related to the Disputed Decision (12). On 22 December 2025 HMRC set out for the first time their position that the 26 July 2018 letter was not an appeal and required no response (13). The Appellant lodged its Notice of Appeal on 8 January 2026 (14).
Core dispute
The central question was whether the Appellant's appeal against the Disputed Decision was made in time. The Appellant's primary case was that, because HMRC had never notified the conclusion of the statutory review requested in July 2018, no 'conclusion date' under section 83G(7) VATA 1994 had occurred, so the 30-day time limit under section 83G(3) had never begun to run, and the appeal was therefore in time (2, 23).
HMRC accepted that a valid request for a review had been made in July 2018 but contended that a failure to complete the review could not indefinitely suspend the time limit for appealing, and that the appeal, lodged many years after the Disputed Decision, was late (3, 25). HMRC invited the Tribunal to apply the principles in Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) and refuse permission for a late appeal (3, 25).
Before reaching the late appeal question, the Tribunal had to determine whether a 'conclusion date' had occurred for the purposes of section 83G VATA 1994, since this was a jurisdictional precondition to any appeal (21).
Court findings
The Tribunal found that the letters sent by Pesters Chartered Accountants in July 2018 constituted a valid request for a review, which was not disputed by HMRC (16). Accordingly, HMRC were required to carry out a review pursuant to section 83C VATA 1994 (28).
The Tribunal distinguished between a 'deemed conclusion' arising under section 83F(8) VATA 1994, where HMRC fail to notify review conclusions within the statutory period, and the 'conclusion date' defined in section 83G(7) VATA 1994 as 'the date of the document notifying the conclusions of the review' (29-30). This distinction was consistent with the reasoning in Meter Squared Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2024] UKFTT 884 (TC) and Heaven Dry Cleaners Limited v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 781 (TC) (31-33, 59).
Following directions issued on 13 May 2026, the only document identified as potentially notifying the conclusion of the review was the witness statement of Adam Johnson dated 22 December 2025 (39-42). The Tribunal held that this witness statement, prepared for insolvency proceedings to support a winding-up petition, did not constitute notification of the conclusions of a review; it did not state that a review had occurred, did not refer to any deemed conclusion, and was inconsistent with HMRC's acceptance elsewhere that the 26 July 2018 letter was a valid review request (43-47).
As no document notifying the conclusions of the review had been identified, the Tribunal found that no conclusion date had occurred for the purposes of section 83G VATA 1994 (52, 54). Since section 83G(3)(a) provides that an appeal may not be made until the conclusion date, that statutory precondition had not been satisfied, and the appeal was premature rather than late (55-58). The Tribunal held it therefore lacked jurisdiction to determine the appeal (60).
Outcome
The Tribunal held that the appeal was brought before the occurrence of a conclusion date within the meaning of section 83G(7) VATA 1994, and was therefore premature (63). As a result, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the appeal, and it was struck out pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (60, 63).
It was unnecessary to determine the Appellant's alternative application for permission to make a late appeal or to consider the Martland principles (61). The Tribunal also declined to reach conclusions on HMRC's separate objection concerning the appealability of the VAT assessment where no return had been submitted, given the strike out on jurisdictional grounds and the absence of full submissions on that point (62).
The decision does not determine the merits of the Disputed Decision and does not prevent the Appellant from bringing a future appeal once a conclusion date occurs (64). In a postscript, the Tribunal noted that the Appellant remains unable to exercise its statutory appeal rights and expressed its expectation that HMRC would comply with its obligation under section 83F(9) VATA 1994 to notify the Appellant of the conclusion which the review is treated as having reached (65).
Major issues / areas of contention
- Whether the Appellant's letter of 26 July 2018 constituted a valid request for a statutory review under section 83C VATA 1994.
- Whether a 'deemed conclusion' of a review under section 83F(8) VATA 1994 can substitute for the 'conclusion date' defined in section 83G(7) VATA 1994.
- Whether the witness statement of Adam Johnson dated 22 December 2025, prepared for insolvency proceedings, constituted notification of the conclusion of the review under sections 83F(9) and 83G(7) VATA 1994.
- Whether, in the absence of a conclusion date, the appeal was late, in time, or premature for the purposes of section 83G(3) VATA 1994.
- Whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to determine the appeal given the absence of a conclusion date.
- Whether the VAT assessment of £958,578 was appealable in circumstances where no VAT return had been submitted.