This decision concerns an application by HMRC to stay proceedings, or suspend existing directions, in Mr Hall's appeal against a joint and several liability notice (JSLN), pending determination of HMRC's appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the FTT's January 2026 Decision on preliminary issues (2).
The Tribunal, applying the principles in HMRC v RBS Deutschland Holdings GmbH [2007] STC 814, considered whether the Upper Tribunal's decision would provide material assistance in resolving issues in the appeal and, if so, whether it was expedient to grant a stay (19, 28).
The Tribunal granted HMRC's application and suspended the February 2026 Directions pending the Upper Tribunal's decision (33, 48).
On 2 April 2024, HMRC issued a JSLN to Mr Hall under paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 13 Finance Act 2020, asserting joint and several liability of £1,687,010.04 in respect of tax liabilities of Peach Building Solutions Ltd, Manchester Construction Group Ltd and Intra City Construction Group Ltd, of which Mr Hall had been a director (7).
Mr Hall appealed the JSLN to the FTT on 13 August 2024, raising five grounds concerning whether Condition D in paragraph 3(6) Schedule 13 FA 2020 was met, whether the JSLN was necessary for protection of the revenue, proportionality under Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, irrationality, and failure to follow HMRC's own guidance (8).
On 14 March 2025, the FTT issued standard directions requiring Mr Hall to serve witness statements and skeleton arguments before HMRC (10). Mr Hall applied to set these aside on 23 April 2025, and HMRC separately applied on 25 July 2025 to strike out Grounds 3 to 5 (11).
Following a preliminary hearing on 16 December 2025, the FTT issued the January 2026 Decision, released 13 January 2026, allowing Mr Hall's application, refusing HMRC's strike-out application, and concluding that the JSLN involved determination of a criminal charge under Article 6 ECHR, that HMRC bore the burden of proof, and that the FTT had jurisdiction to hear Grounds 3 to 5 (12). The FTT then issued the February 2026 Directions on 6 February 2026, reversing the order of exchange so that HMRC would serve witness statements and skeleton arguments first (13).
HMRC applied for permission to appeal the January 2026 Decision on 10 March 2026, raising five grounds, and the FTT granted permission on all grounds on 18 March 2026 (14, 15). On 15 April 2026, HMRC applied to suspend the February 2026 Directions pending the UT appeal, which Mr Hall opposed (16). The UT listed HMRC's appeal for hearing in a three-day window between 20 and 22 January 2027 (17).
The sole issue before the Tribunal was whether the proceedings should be stayed, or the February 2026 Directions suspended, pending determination of HMRC's appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the January 2026 Decision (18).
Both parties agreed the applicable test was whether the UT's decision was likely to provide material assistance in resolving issues in the appeal and, if so, whether it was expedient in all the circumstances to grant a stay, per RBS Deutschland (19).
HMRC argued the UT appeal concerned matters central to the future conduct of the appeal, that any delay would be limited given the January 2027 UT hearing date, and that proceeding without a stay risked wasted costs (20, 21). Mr Hall accepted the UT decision would be of material assistance but argued HMRC had not shown it was expedient to stay proceedings, citing the seriousness of the allegations, the substantial financial liability, risk of prejudice from delay, and the staleness of witness evidence (22, 23).
The Tribunal found that the UT's decision would plainly be materially relevant, determining jurisdiction over certain grounds of appeal, whether grounds should be struck out, and where the burden of proof lay (36).
The Tribunal held it would not be fair and just to allow Mr Hall to retain the benefit of the February 2026 Directions, reversing the order of service of evidence, when that benefit was based on a conclusion about burden of proof that was itself under appeal to the UT (39).
The Tribunal found that allowing the February 2026 Directions to take effect risked the parties preparing cases on grounds of appeal (Grounds 3 to 5) that might never form part of the proceedings, risking unnecessary time and expense (41, 42).
The Tribunal accepted Mr Watkinson's concern about evidence becoming stale but considered that the parties could take steps to preserve evidence in the meantime, and that it would not be consistent with the overriding objective to depart from the process of resolving preliminary issues first (44, 45).
On the Article 6 ECHR reasonable time point, the Tribunal held that the threshold for a breach is high, requiring the delay to be "excessive" per Dyer v Watson [2004] 1 AC 379 at [52], and found that the likely delay awaiting the UT decision, with the hearing already listed for January 2027, was reasonable and proportionate, not excessive (46).
The Tribunal granted HMRC's application to suspend the February 2026 Directions pending the decision of the Upper Tribunal on the appeal against the January 2026 Decision (48).
The Tribunal indicated it would accept HMRC's suggestion that any suspension be lifted once the UT issued its decision, and would circulate directions to that effect (47, 48).