Judgment summary
This decision concerns an application for anonymity made by the Appellant, K, in his appeal against the Respondent's refusal on further review dated 22 January 2026 (the Refusal) to restore goods seized at East Midlands airport on 11 December 2023 (paras 1-2).
The Refusal referred to a 2014 German conviction of the Appellant for customs offences, resulting in a four-year custodial sentence, which the Respondent relied on as evidence that the Appellant would have been aware of customs regimes and the consequences of non-compliance (para 2, para 10(3)).
The Appellant applied for anonymity, not for a private hearing, contending that identification would breach his rights under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (the ROA) and/or Article 8 ECHR, since the conviction was spent (paras 3-4).
The Tribunal addressed two questions: first, whether the ROA alone required the Tribunal to grant anonymity, and second, whether Article 8, read against the background of the ROA, required anonymity (para 5).
The Tribunal held that the ROA alone did not provide a basis for anonymity but that Article 8 ECHR did, and allowed the Anonymity Application (paras 40-43, 64-65).
Background
The Appellant arrived into the UK from Spain on 11 December 2023 and walked through the 'Nothing to Declare' channel at East Midlands airport. Border Force seized goods including three luxury watches and a luxury suitcase and bag, pursuant to s.139(1) Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA), on the basis that they were liable to forfeiture under s.49 CEMA (para 7).
The Appellant did not challenge the legality of the seizure in the magistrates' court, and the goods were condemned as forfeit under CEMA (para 8).
On 25 March 2024 the Appellant requested restoration of the goods. An initial refusal was upheld on review and appealed to the Tribunal, but before that hearing the Respondent conceded the appeal and a re-review was directed (para 9).
On 22 January 2026 the Respondent issued the Refusal again refusing restoration. In the Refusal, the Review Officer referred to PNC records showing a 2014 German conviction for customs offences resulting in a four-year custodial sentence, noted the Appellant's failure to provide details of the conviction, and stated that Border Force had authority to take this information into account, limiting its consideration to the fact that it showed the Appellant's awareness of customs regimes and the consequences of non-compliance (para 10).
On 20 February 2026 the Appellant appealed, including the Anonymity Application (para 11). The Respondent initially opposed the application on two grounds, both of which the Tribunal found to lack force (para 12).
The parties later agreed a draft consent order granting anonymity without prejudice to their substantive arguments, but the Tribunal declined to vacate the hearing solely on consent, noting it must independently consider open justice (paras 13-14). Following clarification from the Respondent that it was content for the Tribunal to assume the conviction was spent for the purposes of the application, the Tribunal vacated the hearing and determined the application on the papers (paras 15-18).
Core dispute
The dispute concerned whether the Appellant was entitled to anonymity in the appeal proceedings and in any published decision, given that the Refusal under appeal referred to a conviction which the Appellant contended was spent under the ROA.
Two questions arose: first, whether the ROA itself, in particular the general statement in section 4(1), conferred a right to anonymity where a spent conviction would otherwise be disclosed in proceedings; and second, whether Article 8 ECHR, read against the background of the ROA, required anonymity to protect the Appellant's private life (para 5).
The Respondent's statement of case set out a primary argument that it relied on the underlying conduct rather than the Conviction itself (citing Hussain v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2020] EWCA Civ 1539), and an alternative argument seeking admission of the Conviction under section 7(3) ROA if reliance on the Conviction itself was found (para 22). The Tribunal noted that its determination of the Anonymity Application did not prejudice resolution of those substantive arguments (paras 21-24).
Court findings
The Tribunal found, on the balance of probabilities, that the Conviction was now spent, given the Respondent's acceptance of the relevant dates and the operation of section 5(2) of the ROA (paras 19-20).
On Issue 1, the Tribunal held that the Appellant did not have a substantive right to anonymity directly under the ROA. There is no explicit right to anonymity articulated in the ROA, and such a right could not be implied into the general statement in section 4(1), given the specific and limited rights articulated elsewhere in the ROA (such as the power to admit evidence of a spent conviction under section 7(3)), and given the authorities in L v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 811 and the Hussain cases, which indicate that ROA protections are limited and do not extend to confidentiality or anonymity (paras 40-43).
On Issue 2, the Tribunal held that identifying the Appellant by name, given that the hearing and decision could not avoid reference to the Conviction, would interfere with his Article 8 rights, since a spent conviction forms part of a person's private life, as established in R(T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35 (paras 61-62).
The Tribunal then considered whether that interference was justified under Article 8.2, balancing it against open justice and Article 10 rights, applying the approach in Dettori v HMRC [2024] UKUT 364 (TCC) and In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1. It found there was no evidence of likely press interest in the appeal, the matter did not concern entry to a regulated profession as in L, and the appeal proceedings and any published decision would remain public notwithstanding anonymisation, limiting the impact on open justice compared with a private hearing (para 63).
The Tribunal concluded there was insufficient general public interest in identifying the Appellant to justify the interference with his Article 8 rights, and that anonymisation was no more than necessary, being a more limited derogation from open justice than alternatives such as a private hearing or non-publication of the decision (para 63(8)-(9)).
Outcome
The Tribunal allowed the Appellant's application for anonymity (para 65). The decision itself was issued in anonymised form (para 18). The Tribunal noted that its determination on anonymity did not prejudice or prejudge the resolution of the substantive appeal concerning the legality of the Respondent's reliance on the Conviction (paras 21-24, 63(7)).
Major issues / areas of contention
- Whether the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 alone confers a right to anonymity in tribunal proceedings where a spent conviction would otherwise be disclosed.
- Whether identifying the Appellant by name would interfere with his Article 8 ECHR rights given the spent conviction referred to in the Refusal.
- If Article 8 is engaged, whether that interference is justified by reference to open justice and the Article 10 rights of others.
- Whether the parties' consent to anonymity is sufficient for the Tribunal to grant an anonymity order.
- Whether granting anonymity for the purposes of the application compromises the Respondent's substantive arguments in the appeal, including its primary case that it relied on conduct rather than the Conviction itself, and its alternative case under section 7(3) ROA.