Judgment summary
This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) on an application by Kashif Javaid for permission to appeal against the First-tier Tribunal's decision released on 17 December 2025 (AA Com Limited, Victory Telecom Limited and Kashif Javaid Limited v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 01601 (TC)) (paragraph 1).
The FTT Decision concerned Personal Liability Notices ("PLNs") issued to Mr Javaid under paragraph 19 of Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007, attributing 100% of penalties for deliberate inaccuracies in VAT returns to him as an officer of the relevant companies, totalling £3,212,815 (paragraph 2). The FTT dismissed the appeals against the PLNs (paragraph 2).
Mr Javaid, who was unrepresented at the FTT hearing, later instructed counsel and sought to raise a new ground of appeal not argued below, namely that paragraph 19 should be read compatibly with Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR (A1P1) via section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, such that the proportionate amount attributable to him was nil (paragraphs 3, 7-9).
The Upper Tribunal, applying the principles in Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360, concluded that determining the new ground would require further evidence and factual enquiry, particularly concerning Mr Javaid's personal financial circumstances, which the FTT had made no findings on (paragraphs 17-19). The Tribunal found this would cause real prejudice to HMRC, who would have wished to investigate and cross-examine on Mr Javaid's means had the point been raised earlier (paragraph 26). Permission to advance the new ground, and consequently permission to appeal, were refused (paragraphs 32-34).
Background
Mr Javaid applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal against the FTT Decision released on 17 December 2025, following a hearing on 12-15 and 19 May 2025 (paragraph 1).
The FTT Decision concerned Personal Liability Notices issued under paragraph 19 of Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007, which permits HMRC to make an officer of a company personally liable, up to 100%, for a penalty imposed on the company for a deliberate inaccuracy attributable to that officer (paragraph 2).
HMRC issued three PLNs to Mr Javaid: two in respect of penalties assessed on Victory Telecom Limited, and one in respect of a penalty assessed on AA Com Limited, attributing 100% of the penalties to him, totalling £3,212,815 (paragraph 2). The FTT found the Schedule 24 penalties arose from deliberate inaccuracies in the companies' VAT returns attributable to Mr Javaid, and that HMRC correctly exercised its power to attribute 100% to him. The FTT dismissed the appeals against the PLNs (paragraph 2).
Mr Javaid was not represented at the FTT hearing but subsequently instructed counsel, who advanced a new ground concerning proportionality under Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR that had not been raised before the FTT (paragraph 3). The FTT refused permission to appeal on 20 March 2026. Mr Javaid applied to the Upper Tribunal for permission on 15 April 2026. HMRC objected on 20 May 2026 on the basis that the proportionality issue had not previously been raised, and the matter was listed for an oral hearing on 2 July 2026 (paragraph 3).
Core dispute
The dispute concerned whether Mr Javaid should be permitted to raise, for the first time on appeal, a new ground that paragraph 19 of Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007 should be read down under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to comply with Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR, such that the amount of penalty attributed to him could not exceed a proportionate amount, said to be nil (paragraphs 5-9).
Mr Javaid argued that the factual material necessary for a proportionality assessment was already before the FTT, including findings on the operation of the businesses, his role, and low profit margins (typically below 1%, sometimes 0.25% to 0.75%), and that no new evidence was required (paragraphs 14-15).
HMRC argued the proportionality challenge could not be determined without further evidence, particularly as to Mr Javaid's personal financial circumstances, and that had the point been raised before the FTT, HMRC would have sought disclosure and cross-examination on those matters (paragraph 16). The appeal was confirmed to be solely that of Mr Javaid personally; no appeal was brought by the corporate appellants against the underlying company penalties (paragraph 10).
Court findings
The Upper Tribunal accepted HMRC's submissions that, while the interpretation of paragraph 19 in light of section 3 HRA 1998 and A1P1 was a question of law, the application of that question required further evidence not before the FTT (paragraph 17).
The Tribunal noted the FTT made no findings on Mr Javaid's personal assets, liabilities, income, resources or ability to satisfy the PLN liabilities, and that counsel for Mr Javaid accepted this at the hearing (paragraphs 15, 17).
The Tribunal found that the proposed challenge was directed principally to the third and fourth stages of the Bank Mellat proportionality test (whether a less intrusive measure could have been used, and whether a fair balance had been struck), which were inherently fact-sensitive (paragraph 17).
The Tribunal rejected the argument that case management measures of the type used in Altrad Services Ltd v HMRC [2023] EWCA Civ 474 could mitigate the prejudice to HMRC, distinguishing that case's narrower factual issue (paragraph 27). The Tribunal accepted HMRC's submission that real prejudice would arise because HMRC would have wished to investigate Mr Javaid's financial circumstances through disclosure and cross-examination had the point been raised earlier (paragraphs 16, 26-27).
The Tribunal gave limited weight to the fact Mr Javaid was a litigant in person before the FTT (paragraph 29), and found that wider interests of justice, including finality in litigation, weighed against permitting the new ground (paragraph 31).
The Tribunal further held that, even had permission to advance the new ground been granted, it would not have granted permission to appeal, because any arguable error of law would not be material to the outcome absent findings on Mr Javaid's personal circumstances (paragraph 33).
Outcome
Permission to advance the new ground of appeal was refused (paragraph 32). It followed that permission to appeal was also refused (paragraph 34).
Major issues / areas of contention
- Whether Mr Javaid could raise, for the first time on appeal, a new ground based on Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR proportionality and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998
- Whether the proposed proportionality assessment could be undertaken solely on the facts already found by the FTT or required further evidence, particularly as to Mr Javaid's personal financial circumstances
- Application of the principles in Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360 governing new points raised on appeal
- Whether HMRC would suffer prejudice if the new ground were allowed, and whether such prejudice could be mitigated by case management
- Whether any arguable error of law in the FTT Decision would be material to the outcome of the appeal