Paul Macdonald appealed against late filing penalties totalling £1,700.00 imposed under Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009 for his self-assessment returns for the tax years ending 5 April 2023 and 5 April 2024 [4]. Both returns were filed electronically on 15 April 2025, making the 2022/23 return 440 days late and the 2023/24 return 74 days late [8].
Mr Macdonald argued he had a reasonable excuse because he relied on a friend, Mr O'Connor, to complete the returns, and because he later had difficulty accessing his bank statements due to an online glitch [11]-[14]. HMRC contended that reliance on a third party is only a reasonable excuse where the taxpayer took reasonable care to avoid the failure, which Mr Macdonald had not done [17]-[20].
The Tribunal found that the notices to file and penalty notices were validly delivered electronically under the Income and Corporation Taxes (Electronic Communications) Regulations 2003 [28], and that the penalties had been correctly calculated under paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009 [29]. Applying the test in Christine Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0156 (TCC) and paragraph 23(2)(b) of Schedule 55, the Tribunal concluded that Mr Macdonald had not taken reasonable care in delegating his returns to Mr O'Connor and therefore had no reasonable excuse [32]-[45]. The appeal was dismissed [49].
Mr Macdonald, a self-employed craftsman making custom swords and knives, had signed up on 15 February 2022 to receive paperless communications from HMRC through his online Personal Tax Account, providing a verified email address [5]. HMRC issued notices to file for the tax years ending 5 April 2023 and 5 April 2024 to his secure mailbox, with accompanying email alerts, on 6 April 2023 and 6 April 2024 respectively [6]-[7].
Both self-assessment returns were received electronically by HMRC on 15 April 2025 [8]. Penalty notices, daily penalty warnings and a statement of account were issued and delivered to Mr Macdonald's secure mailbox and verified email address at various points between February 2024 and February 2025 [9].
Mr Macdonald appealed to HMRC on 15 April 2025, the day he filed the returns. HMRC upheld the penalties in a view of the matter letter dated 6 May 2025 and, following a statutory review requested in November 2025, upheld the decision again by letter dated 24 November 2025, finding no special circumstances justifying a reduction. Mr Macdonald notified his appeal to the Tribunal on 16 December 2025 [10].
The issues before the Tribunal were whether the late filing penalties were correctly issued, whether Mr Macdonald had a reasonable excuse for the late filing of both returns, whether, if a reasonable excuse existed, the returns were filed without unreasonable delay once that excuse ceased, and whether HMRC's decision on special reduction of the penalties was flawed [24].
Mr Macdonald did not dispute that the penalties were correctly issued, but argued he had a reasonable excuse because he had relied on his friend Mr O'Connor to complete and file his returns, and later experienced a technical problem accessing his bank statements [26], [33]. HMRC argued that reliance on a third party is only capable of being a reasonable excuse where the taxpayer took reasonable care to avoid the failure, under paragraph 23(2)(b) of Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009, and that Mr Macdonald had not done so [17]-[19], [32].
The Tribunal found that HMRC had discharged its burden of showing the penalties were prima facie due, applying Christine Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0156 (TCC) at [69] [27]. It found the notices to file and penalty notices were validly delivered electronically, Mr Macdonald having confirmed he had seen them, and that the penalties under paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009 had been correctly calculated [28]-[29].
Applying the Perrin framework and paragraph 23(2)(b) of Schedule 55, the Tribunal held that reliance on a third party is not itself a reasonable excuse unless the taxpayer took reasonable care to avoid the failure [31]-[32]. It found that Mr Macdonald gave Mr O'Connor, who had no relevant qualifications, no written instructions or deadlines, made no checks that the returns had been filed, and did not use his Personal Tax Account to verify this, and so had not taken reasonable care [34], [39].
The Tribunal further held that, even if reliance had initially been reasonable, it ceased to be so once Mr Macdonald received the first penalty notice on 13 February 2024, after which he knew or ought to have known the 2022/23 return had not been filed [40]. The same reasoning applied to the 2023/24 return, given the penalties already accrued by the time it fell due [41]. The banking difficulty, arising only in 2025 after both filing dates had passed, could not amount to a reasonable excuse [42]. The Tribunal noted HMRC's website guidance that third-party reliance can amount to a reasonable excuse does not override the statutory requirement of reasonable care under paragraph 23(2)(b) [43], citing Walker v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 865 (TC) at [50]-[54] as reaching a similar conclusion [44].
The Tribunal also found that, even if a reasonable excuse had existed, the 14-month delay before filing the 2022/23 return after the excuse ceased was unreasonable under paragraph 23(2)(c) of Schedule 55 [46]. On special reduction, the Tribunal found HMRC's review decision was not flawed in the Wednesbury sense required by paragraph 22(3) and (4) of Schedule 55, and identified no special circumstances justifying a reduction [47], citing Hok Ltd v HMRC [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) at [36] and [56]-[58] for the proposition that the Tribunal cannot discharge or reduce a penalty merely because it considers it harsh [48].
The Tribunal dismissed Mr Macdonald's appeal, finding that the penalty notices were validly served, the penalties of £1,700.00 arose in accordance with Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009 and were correctly calculated, that he had no reasonable excuse for either late filing, and that HMRC's decision on special reduction was not flawed [49]. An ex-tempore judgment dismissing the appeal was delivered at the hearing, with this written judgment prepared at Mr Macdonald's request [50].