This decision concerns HMRC's application to strike out Mr Palmer-Cowell's appeal under Rule 8(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, on the basis that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction (1).
The Tribunal determined the matter on the papers, without a hearing, based on the Notice of Appeal dated 27 May 2026, HMRC's strike-out application dated 29 July 2026, Mr Palmer-Cowell's response dated 16 August 2026 and HMRC's reply dated 30 September 2026.
The Tribunal concluded that it did not have jurisdiction and that the appeal had to be struck out for all three tax years in issue (2).
On 30 October 2025 HMRC issued Mr Palmer-Cowell with a simple assessment under section 28H Taxes Management Act 1970 for tax year 2024-2025 (4).
Mr Palmer-Cowell disputed the assessment and asked HMRC to carry out a 'mandatory reconsideration' or 'mandatory review' (5).
He also raised matters relating to tax years 2025-2026 and 2026-2027, but HMRC submitted there were no appealable decisions for these years (6).
HMRC accepted that the Assessment should ultimately result in an appealable decision, noting that Mr Palmer-Cowell had queried the assessment under section 31AA TMA, that HMRC were considering the query and were required to give a final response under section 31AA(4) TMA, and that only once that final response was given would Mr Palmer-Cowell have a right of appeal under section 31(1)(d) TMA (8).
Mr Palmer-Cowell also raised concerns regarding HMRC's conduct, including complaints handling, communication, reasonable adjustments, disability-related support, delay, discrimination and unfair treatment (10).
The issue before the Tribunal was narrow: whether the statutory conditions were satisfied such that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal (11).
The Tribunal made clear that the issue was not whether Mr Palmer-Cowell's income tax liability had been correctly calculated or whether the Assessment was correct, and it did not reach any conclusion on that substantive tax dispute (12).
Mr Palmer-Cowell submitted that HMRC should not be permitted to rely on their own failure to issue a final response as the reason for striking out his appeal, and asked the Tribunal to direct HMRC to provide its final response (9).
The Tribunal found that no appealable decision existed for tax years 2025-2026 and 2026-2027, so it had no jurisdiction over those years (17).
For tax year 2024-2025, section 31(3A) TMA provides that the right to appeal a simple assessment does not arise unless and until the person has raised a query under section 31AA and been given a final response to that query (15, 18).
Both parties agreed that no final response had been provided, so the statutory process had not yet reached the stage at which a right of appeal arises (19, 20).
The Tribunal accepted that the absence of a final response could not be attributed to any failure by Mr Palmer-Cowell to engage with the statutory process (22), but found that responsibility for the delay was not the question it was required to decide; the only relevant question was whether HMRC had issued the final response required by legislation, and both parties agreed they had not (24).
The Tribunal further held that its case-management powers arise only in proceedings over which it has jurisdiction, and since no appeal right yet existed, it had no jurisdiction to direct HMRC to issue a final response or to manage HMRC's consideration of the query (28).
The Tribunal struck out the appeal in its entirety, covering tax years 2024-2025, 2025-2026 and 2026-2027, for lack of jurisdiction (21, 29).
The Tribunal stated this decision did not bring Mr Palmer-Cowell's substantive dispute to an end; HMRC informed the Tribunal they would now issue their final response, and if Mr Palmer-Cowell remained dissatisfied after receiving it, he might then be able to bring an appeal in accordance with the statutory scheme (30).
The Tribunal expressed hope that HMRC's final response would clearly explain the basis of the Assessment and address Mr Palmer-Cowell's concerns (31). The parties were notified of the right to apply for permission to appeal under Rule 39 within 56 days of the decision being sent (32).