This is a decision on an oral renewal of an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber). The applicants, Mr Per Wimmer and Wimmer Financial LLP, sought permission to appeal against the First-tier Tribunal's decision of 10 July 2025, which had refused them permission to bring late appeals (paragraphs 1 to 2).
The Upper Tribunal Judge had previously refused permission on the papers on 11 March 2026. This decision follows an oral renewal hearing on 17 April 2026, together with subsequent written submissions from HMRC dated 1 May 2026 and a response from the applicant dated 5 May 2026 (paragraph 2).
Mr Wimmer represented the applicants in person and Alexander Barrett of HMRC Legal Group appeared for HMRC (paragraph 2). The Judge considered six grounds of appeal, focusing at the oral hearing on Ground 4 (merits of the underlying appeal) and Ground 5 (alleged prejudice). Permission to appeal was refused on all grounds (paragraphs 34 to 36).
The FTT Decision concerned whether the applicants should be permitted to bring late appeals. In Mr Wimmer's case this concerned a number of discovery assessments and closure notices for tax years 2007-8 to 2020-1 (except 2015-16) totalling £866,106.25. In Wimmer Financial LLP's case it concerned appeals against closure notices for 2017-18 to 2020-21 which reallocated various amounts of share of profits (£254,221) to Mr Wimmer (paragraph 3).
The appeals were late by between 96 and 292 days. The FTT found these delays serious and significant, held there was no good reason for failing to comply with the 30-day statutory appeal time limits, rejected the contention that a June 2023 letter amounted to a protected appeal, and found the appellants had focused on settlement discussions rather than appealing. Applying Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC), the FTT held that finality and efficient conduct outweighed any prejudice to the appellants and refused permission to bring the late appeals (paragraph 4).
The applicants advanced six grounds of appeal. Ground 1 argued the FTT misapplied authorities including Ingenious Games, Edwards v Bairstow, Georgiou and Megtian, and overlooked favourable evidence. Ground 2 concerned the length of delay, arguing the appeal was instructed within 30 days and adviser delay should not automatically preclude relief. Ground 3 challenged the FTT's assessment of reasons for delay, citing injustice, Convention rights and the gravity of consequences. Ground 4 concerned the arguability and merits of the underlying appeal, alleging errors including double taxation and incorrect application of the 'non-dom' rules. Ground 5 addressed prejudice, submitting the FTT failed to weigh minimal prejudice to HMRC against significant prejudice to the appellants. Ground 6 argued refusal would be contrary to the Upper Tribunal's overriding objective (paragraph 6).
At the oral hearing, argument concentrated on Ground 4 and Ground 5, with Mr Wimmer developing arguments on the remittance basis for non-domiciled status, alleged double taxation via a '200% rate', the financial position of Wimmer Family Office Ltd, the validity of assessments given lengthy time limits, and the severity of consequences including bankruptcy risk and loss of FCA regulatory approval (paragraphs 8 to 33).
On jurisdiction, the Upper Tribunal noted an appeal from the FTT lies only on a point of law under section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, and permission is only granted where grounds disclose an arguable error of law (paragraph 5). The exercise of discretion on late appeals could only be interfered with on the basis set out in Walbrook Trustees v Fattal and Ors [2008] EWCA 35 Civ 427 at [33] (paragraph 7).
On the 'non-dom' remittance basis argument, the Tribunal found the remittance basis is not automatic and depends on statutory conditions, including a valid claim under section 809B ITA 2007 or automatic application under section 809D. HMRC's position on a year-by-year basis was that the conditions were not met in the relevant years, so the arising basis applied by default. The Tribunal found this disclosed, at most, a factual dispute requiring investigation, not an overwhelmingly strong case (paragraphs 9 to 15).
On the alleged double taxation or '200% rate' argument, the Tribunal found the adjustments were reallocations of partnership profit shares between the appellant and a corporate member rather than duplicated charges, and there was no indication in the FTT's findings that the same profits were taxed twice (paragraphs 16 to 22).
On the position of Wimmer Family Office Ltd, the Tribunal noted this entity was not itself the subject of the appeals before the FTT, and found HMRC's case on dividend income rested on a wider analysis of bank statements covering multiple income categories, not solely on WFO (paragraphs 23 to 26).
On time limits, the Tribunal noted the statutory scheme allows extended time limits of up to 20 years where loss of tax is attributable to deliberate conduct, and whether this was validly engaged was a fact-sensitive question not resolvable as overwhelmingly in the appellant's favour (paragraphs 27 to 29).
On prejudice, the Tribunal found no detailed case regarding loss of FCA authorisation had been squarely put before the FTT, and that serious adverse consequences, even if grave, do not necessarily outweigh the importance of statutory time limits or the public interest in finality (paragraphs 30 to 33).
The Tribunal concluded that Grounds 1 to 3 and 6, and further points under Grounds 4 and 5, did not disclose any arguable error of law, for reasons already covered in the paper refusal decision (paragraph 34).
The Upper Tribunal was not persuaded that any of the points raised, in writing or orally, passed the threshold of identifying an arguable error of law in the FTT Decision. Permission to appeal was refused (paragraphs 35 to 36).