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Case summary · 13 November 2026

Stevenage Skip Hire Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC

Tax AdministrationPenalties and InterestTax Court Procedure
Landfill TaxSection 40 FA 1996Section 41(4) FA 1996Joint And Several LiabilityAmendment Of Grounds Of AppealQuah PrinciplesTaxable DisposalLandfill Site OperatorSchedule 5 InterestHardship ApplicationTribunal Procedure RulesLate AmendmentPublic Interest In Correct Tax

Judgment summary

This decision concerns an application by the appellant, Stevenage Skip Hire Limited, to amend its grounds of appeal in a landfill tax dispute with HMRC (1). HMRC had assessed the appellant on 12 February 2024 under s 50A of the Finance Act 1996, seeking to hold it 100% liable for a landfill tax charge of £114,009 and interest of £62,570.04, on the basis of joint and several liability under s 41(4) FA 1996 (1).

The appellant's original grounds of appeal, submitted in April 2024, argued it was not liable because another person was also liable. On 17 November 2025 the appellant applied to amend its grounds to raise four new arguments, including that the material delivered was not 'disposed of' for the purposes of s 40 FA 1996, that if it was disposed of the site operator alone was liable, that the tax calculation applied the wrong rate to some deliveries, and that interest should be reduced under paragraph 28 of Schedule 5 FA 1996 (2).

HMRC objected to the amendment, arguing it was made very late, lacked merit, and would cause real prejudice (36). The tribunal, applying the principles in Quah v Goldman Sachs International and related authorities, decided that the application was not 'late' or 'very late', that the new grounds had a realistic prospect of success, and that it was in the interests of justice to permit the appellant to rely on them (52)-(54).

Background

The appellant provides skip hire, recycling and waste management services in Stevenage, Hitchin, Letchworth and surrounding areas, and runs a recycling centre where hardcore waste is crushed to produce aggregates (6).

Between 1 January 2021 and 21 June 2021, the appellant delivered 90 loads of crushed hardcore to Tudor Oak Lodge, Taylor Road, Stotfold (7). The appellant asserted that its sole director, Mr Robert Bell, understood the material was to be used to construct a road at the site, which was still in use as an access road and car park for a wedding venue business (7(1)).

On 24 January 2023, Mr Bell and his wife sold the entire share capital in the appellant to Biel Holdings Limited, and Mr Bell ceased to be a director on the same date (12). The sale terms included that Mr Bell would indemnify Biel for pre-existing tax liabilities and that the appellant would authorise him to conduct any related appeal (12).

HMRC made the Assessment on 12 February 2024, asserting the appellant had disposed of material on an unauthorised site and was jointly and severally liable under s 41 FA 1996 (17)-(18). A review on 18 April 2024 reduced the interest liability to £55,150.83 but otherwise upheld the Assessment (20). The appeal was notified to the tribunal on 17 May 2024 (21), and there followed a lengthy period of procedural confusion involving hardship applications and Mr Bell's authority to act, which the tribunal acknowledged and apologised for (22).

Core dispute

The core issue before the tribunal was whether the appellant should be permitted to amend its grounds of appeal to introduce four new grounds: that the crushed hardcore was not 'disposed of' within the meaning of s 40 FA 1996 (2(1)); that, if it was disposed of, Tudor Oak was a landfill site and liability fell on the site operator rather than the appellant under s 41(1) FA 1996 (2(2)); that the tax calculation wrongly applied the later year's rate to some deliveries made before 31 March 2021 (2(3)); and that the interest liability should be reduced under paragraph 28 of Schedule 5 FA 1996 (2(4)).

HMRC objected on the basis that the application was made very late, that there was no good reason for the delay, that allowing the amendment would cause real disruption and prejudice, and that the new grounds had no merit, relying on Butt v Revenue and Customs [2024] UKFTT 893 (TC) (36).

The appellant argued the application was not 'very late' as defined in Quah v Goldman Sachs International [2015] EWHC, that it was made at an early stage before witness statement or listing directions, and that the new grounds had a realistic prospect of success (3), (37).

Court findings

The tribunal, Judge Harriet Morgan, applied the principles in Quah v Goldman Sachs International [2015] EWHC (36)-(38), as considered in Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd v Kemball Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 33, Hannah v HMRC [2024] UKFTT 1116 (TC), Frederiksen & Anor v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 854 (TC), CNM Estates (Tolworth Tower) Ltd v Carvill-Biggs & anor [2023] EWCA Civ 480, and the 'venerable principle' from HMRC v Tower MCashback LLP 1 [2011] UKSC 19 that there is a public interest in taxpayers paying the correct amount of tax (32)-(35).

The tribunal found that the application was not made 'late' or 'very late' within the meaning of the case law, having been made at a relatively early stage of proceedings, reasonably promptly once the hardship application was determined and Mr Bell's authority to act was clarified, and shortly after HMRC's amended statement of case (53(1)). The tribunal noted that delay caused by the tribunal itself in dealing with hardship and authority issues should not weigh against the appellant (53(1)).

The tribunal rejected HMRC's submission that amendments should only be permitted where they clarify or refine existing arguments rather than fundamentally change the case, finding no such general principle, and distinguished Butt v Revenue and Customs [2024] UKFTT 893 (TC) on its facts (53(2)-(3)).

Applying a test akin to summary judgment, the tribunal found the new grounds had a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success, and declined to conduct a mini-trial of the merits (53(4)). The tribunal considered that refusing the application would cause the appellant prejudice in not being able to raise potentially successful grounds, and that this outweighed any prejudice to HMRC from having to deal with additional substantive issues (53(5)). The tribunal noted the appellant had not identified a good reason for not raising the new grounds at the outset, but held this did not outweigh the other factors favouring admission (53(6)).

Outcome

The tribunal decided that the Application is approved and the appellant is entitled to rely on the new grounds in the appeal proceedings (54).

Major issues / areas of contention

  • Whether the appellant's application to amend its grounds of appeal, made on 17 November 2025, was 'late' or 'very late' within the meaning of Quah v Goldman Sachs International.
  • Whether the crushed hardcore delivered to Tudor Oak was 'disposed of' for the purposes of s 40 FA 1996, given it was allegedly intended for and used in road construction.
  • Whether, if the material was disposed of, Tudor Oak was a landfill site, such that liability for landfill tax fell on the site operator under s 41(1) FA 1996 rather than the appellant.
  • Whether the landfill tax calculation in the Assessment wrongly applied the later year's rate (£96.70 per tonne instead of £94.15 per tonne) to deliveries made on or before 31 March 2021.
  • Whether the interest liability should be reduced under paragraph 28 of Schedule 5 FA 1996 having regard to the circumstances, including joint and several liability of other persons and procedural delay.
  • Whether allowing the new grounds would cause real prejudice to HMRC given the procedural history, including HMRC's compliance with directions and the timing of the application relative to the filing of HMRC's document list.